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A Reply to Professor Capra
I would like to thank Professor Capra for reviewing and comment-
ing on my paper. However, I feel that it is important to rearticulate my
concern, which is simply that there are inherent risks in permitting state-
ments of occurrence witnesses made to law enforcement officers offered
by the government in criminal trials to explain police conduct in relation
to a criminal investigation or as background where no issue has been
raised by the defendant with regard to the criminal investigation.
Of pivotal importance is that marginally relevant nonhearsay evi-
dence should not be considered sufficient on its own to be permitted
merely because it arises in the context of a police investigation. The
mere fact that such testimony explains subsequent police investigation
should not be considered sufficient without more to supply the necessary
relevance. This testimony is often admitted at a high price to the defen-
dant. Nevertheless, these statements are regularly admitted as nonhear-
say, viz. for a purpose other than for their truth pursuant to Rule 801.
Where the content of such out-of-court statements are offered by
the government and admitted by the courts containing accusations of
criminal conduct is unfortunately, a regular occurrence in many state
and federal courts. Such statements ought to be permitted where rele-
vant, and if relevant, only if sufficient probative value exists. A require-
ment of enhanced relevance, triggered, for instance, where the defendant
has "opened the door" concerning a police investigation ought to be
required. This requirement ought to be over and above the balancing
required by Rules 401 and 403 for relevance and unfair prejudice. Such
heightened standards would assist in clarifying a very confused area of
the law and protect the rights of defendants. My point is that before
permitting such hearsay statements, the police investigation should be in
issue.
The problem occurs when statements of minimal or no nonhearsay
relevance are admitted as a vehicle to bring before the jury the substance
of out-of-court statements that would otherwise have been barred by the
hearsay rule. These involve highly relevant and highly prejudicial hear-
say statements that are often going to the heart of the only colorable
issue of a criminal trial. To date, there has not yet been incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Evidence a hearsay exception for statements
relating to police investigations. Some courts, however, act as though
there is such an exception and show a wide latitude in admitting ques-
tionably relevant statements vis a vis any nonhearsay purpose.
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The risks involved in permitting accusatory statements made by
occurrence witnesses through the mouth of government witnesses state-
ments are numerous and include as follows:
a. they are not subject to cross examination, nor are they made under
oath;
b. they defeat the constitutional right of confrontation;
c. there exists a very real danger of the jury considering such testi-
mony for its truth.
While a Rule 105 limiting instruction may be given, it is questiona-
ble how effective such instructions are in restricting jurors to consider a
statement exclusively for its nonhearsay purpose, and not for its truth.
Professor Capra characterizes my Comment as charging that courts are
"engaged in a wholesale abrogation of the hearsay rule specifically and a
wholesale trampling on the rights of criminal defendants generally."' I
disagree with this description. My intention was to discuss a universal
problem, existing in state and federal courts alike, concerning the treat-
ment of out-of-court statements as nonhearsay in a criminal context:
"When the only possible relevance of an out of court statement is
directed to the truth of the matters stated by a declarant, the subject
matter is classic hearsay even though the proponent of such evidence
seeks to clothe such hearsay under a nonhearsay label."2
There are three main themes in Professor Capra's response. These
are:
1. The role of Rule 403: Professor Capra asserts that "403 provides
an important protection when an out-of-court accusation is offered as
nonhearsay ...In many cases statements accusing defendants of
crime are subject to exclusion under Rule 403 when offered for back-
ground or to explain the officer's conduct"3
2. The characterization of Old Chief as "defendant friendly" and
an exposition of how a defendant may best reap its legacy.
3. Rule 105 limiting instructions, as distinguished from curative
instructions.
I will respond to each of these concerns.
1. The Role of Rule 403. Professor Capra casts Rule 403 in the
starring role in terms of screening inadmissible evidence while omitting
to discuss the role of Rule 401 in screening inadmissible evidence.
Those federal courts that are willing to admit out-of-court statements
1. Daniel J. Capra, Out-of-Court Accusations Offered For "Background:" A Measured
Response From the Federal Courts, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 818 (2001).
2. Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 274 (Fla. 2000).
3. Capra, supra note 2, at 807.
4. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
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containing accusations of criminal conduct,5 also overlook the Rule 401
aspect and assume relevance by virtue of the statements being offered to
explain a criminal investigation. In other words, these statements are
attributed built-in relevance and are often admitted even though the
criminal investigation is not in issue. My principal thesis is that such
statements should be subjected to a preliminary Rule 401 screening and
it is only if the proffered statements are relevant that Rule 403 chould be
considered.
Professor Capra cites United States v. Evans6 as an illustration of
the approach typically found in the federal courts. Evans is not, how-
ever, a decision that is typical of the treatment applied in federal courts
to out-of-court statements offered by the government to explain police
conduct. It was decided by a court which has not accepted the wholesale
admission of such statements on the theory that they are explanative or
provide background information. To that extent, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit is not representative of the position taken by other federal
courts.
The out-of-court statements containing accusations of criminal con-
duct elicited by the government during its direct examination in Evans
were not concerned with any fact or matter in issue and, as such, had no
relevance, as required by Rule 401.' On that basis alone, the evidence
was inadmissible, and a Rule 403 balancing was not required for the
reason that there was no relevant evidence to balance with unfair
prejudice. Rule 402 requires the exclusion of all evidence that is not
relevant8 That, however, was not the approach taken, the court focused
on Rule 403, finding, inter alia, that the challenged testimony was
admitted in error "because the probative value of the only relevant
nonhearsay purpose-general background-was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."9 The court ultimately
decided that the error was harmless notwithstanding the jury being
exposed to hearsay of the most damning kind, containing references to
the defendant as a drug trafficker. '0
2. Old Chief. I disagree with Professor Capra's characterization
of Old Chief as "defendent friendly." Old Chief is not defendant
5. Nowhere do I make a blanket statement that all federal courts treat such out-of-court
statements as having built-in relevance by virtue of providing an explanation of a criminal
investigation. However, a large number do, and that tends to be the norm.
6. 216 F.3d 80 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
7. See id. at 85-7.
8. "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
9. Evans, 216 F.3d at 89.
10. Id. at 90.
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friendly because the opinion gives prosecutors greater latitude in
presenting evidence. Old Chief reinforces the assumption that had long
been evident in many of the federal courts that the government has a
right to present the story behind a police investigation and that a priori,
this carries its own stamp of relevance, without further inquiry. In doing
so, even with a Rule 403 balancing, the scales are already tipped in favor
of admitting the government's evidence. The decision may be seen as
standing for the proposition that evidence offered to prove the intent and
acts comprising a crime are themselves afforded enhanced relevance in
the balancing required by Rule 403. The Court announced that evidence
might possess "fair and legitimate weight" if it enables the prosecutor to
"tell . . . a colorful story with descriptive richness."' ' Old Chief can
been seen as an affirmation of this approach and reinforcing the status
quo.
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice
Stevens, Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined.
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined. In Old Chief,
Justice Souter provided a rationale for the principle described by the
court as being of unquestionable truth, "that the prosecution is entitled to
prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more directly, that a
criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full
evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it."' 2
The decision represented a narrow departure from that rationale in
so far as it provided that the government in that case ought to have
accepted the defense offer to stipulate to the defendant's felony status
where he had been charged with a federal statute that prohibited posses-
sion of a firearm by any person who had been convicted of a felony.
The Court reiterated the principle that to require the acceptance of a
defendant's bare stipulation for the government's evidence in any other
context
might have the effect to rob the evidence of much of its fair and
legitimate weight ... This recognition that the prosecution with its
burden of persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous
story has, however, virtually no application when the point at issue is
a defendant's legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered
wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behav-
ior charged against him.' 3
Justice O'Connor was of the view that the Court went too far in
11. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187.
12. Id. at 186-87.
13. Id. at 190.
[Vol. 55:819
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR CAPRA
permitting this narrow divergence in the government's right to tell a
story by requiring the acceptance of the stipulation offered and was
troubled by the Court's departure from "the fundamental principle that
in a criminal prosecution the government may prove its case as it sees fit
... On its own terms, the argument does not hold together. A jury is as
likely to be puzzled by the missing chapter resulting from a defendant's
stipulation to his prior felony conviction as it would be by the defen-
dant's conceding any other element of the crime."' 4
3. Rule 105 limiting instructions. Professor Capra asserts that I
have confused the function of Rule 105 limiting instructions with cura-
tive instructions. Rather, it is the case law that gives rise to the confu-
sion of these two types of instructions. In allowing inadmissible
testimony as nonhearsay where its only probative value is in the truth of
the statement, there is a strong likelihood that the jury's verdict will be
improperly shaped by such testimony.
Some courts, including the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Tru-
jillo,15 and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Gonzalez,'6 treat Rule
105 as having a curative function. The Trujillo court found that testi-
mony, though containing accusations of criminal conduct, was nonhear-
say and that any error "was cured by the court's clear instruction to the
jury to limit its consideration of [the testimony]" and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting such testimony.' 7 The
court in Gonzalez was presented with clear evidence that the jury had
improperly considered testimony for its truth, but yet were unshaken in
their belief that the jury had been properly instructed.' 8
These cases evidence a reliance on Rule 105 for a purpose for
which it was not intended. It was not intended to cure inadmissible testi-
mony of any defect. A limiting instruction, no matter how expertly
crafted, cannot turn water into wine, just as it cannot transform hearsay
to nonhearsay. Yet, it is evident that some courts rely on Rule 105 limit-
ing instructions to perform such miracles.
Finally, I did not call for a per se rule of harmful error where an
out-of-court statement is admitted where Rule 403 would mandate its
exclusion. My Comment does not deal with the issue of redress where
there is an occurrence of harmful error. The principle concern of my
Comment concerns nonhearsay relevance. It is in that context that I
make the observation that permitting statements containing accusations
14. Id. at 198.
15. 136 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1998).
16. 967 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1992).
17. Trujillo, 136 F.3d at 1396.
18. See Gonzalez, 967 F.2d at 1035 n.3.
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of criminal conduct is likely to be enormously influential in shaping a
jury's verdict, in particular, they contain highly prejudicial hearsay state-
ments. The principal concerns that my Comment raises are addressed
succinctly in Stribbling v. State: "As a general rule, the investigation
leading to the defendant's arrest is not at issue in a criminal trial. Plac-
ing information before the jury that a non-testifying witness gave police
reliable information implicating the defendant in the very crime charged
clearly could affect the verdict."' 9
In conclusion, where the nonhearsay content of this type of out-of-
court statement has minimal or no relevance, then the statement should
be excluded on both relevance and hearsay grounds. Where a statement
has some nonhearsay relevance, there should be a requirement of
enhanced relevance prior to allowing statements containing accusations
of criminal conduct. Otherwise, highly relevant hearsay evidence will
be admitted, despite its high prejudice to the defendant and lack of
cross-examination. These are the dangers presented.
JOLLE HERVIC
19. Stribbling v. State, 778 So. 2d 452, 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
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